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ABSTRACT
The popular financial press often suggests that convertible debt issued by European
firms is more debt-like in nature than convertible debt issued by US firms. This
paper is the first to formally test the validity of this common perception. Our evi-
dence indicates that European convertibles are effectively structured to be more
debt-like than US convertibles. We also show that European convertible debt
announcements induce less negative stockholder reactions than US announcements,
which is consistent with the larger debt component of the former securities. Lastly,
we explore some potential explanations for the relatively more debt-like design of
European convertibles. Our results indicate that this finding may be attributable to
both issuer-related and institutional differences across European and US convertible
debt markets.
* * *
In de financiële pers wordt vaak gesuggereerd dat converteerbare obligaties uitge-
geven door Europese bedrijven een grotere schuldcomponent hebben dan conver-
teerbare obligaties uitgegeven door Amerikaanse bedrijven. In deze paper testen we
de geldigheid van deze populaire opvatting door de kenmerken van een steekproef
van Europese en Amerikaanse converteerbare obligaties te vergelijken. We vinden
dat Europese converteerbare obligaties inderdaad een grotere schuldcomponent heb-
ben dan hun Amerikaanse tegenhangers. Daarenboven tonen we aan dat de aande-
lenkoersen van Europese emittenten minder negatief reageren op de aankondiging
van de converteerbare uitgifte. Deze bevinding is consistent met de grotere schuld-
component vervat in Europese convertibles. Tot slot onderzoeken we enkele moge-
lijke verklaringen voor de verschillende structuur van Europese en Amerikaanse
converteerbare obligaties. Onze resultaten geven aan dat de grotere schuldcompo-
nent van Europese convertibles zowel door ondernemingsgerelateerde als door insti-
tutionele verschillen tussen de Europese en de Amerikaanse markt voor conver-
teerbare obligaties kan verklaard worden.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Convertible bonds are debt securities that offer the holder the option
to convert the bonds into equity of the issuing firm. They thus com-
bine the downside protection of a bond with some of the upside poten-
tial of a stock.
Over the past decades, a substantial literature has developed exam-
ining the stock price effects of convertible debt announcements. Most
studies find that convertibles induce negative announcement effects
intermediate between the announcement effects traditionally reported
for straight debt and pure equity. This is consistent with the hybrid
debt-equity nature of convertible debt. Nevertheless, it is remarkable
that European studies on convertible debt generally detect less nega-
tive announcement effects than US-based studies. For example,
whereas Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Billingsley, Lamy and Smith
(1990) and Nanda and Yun (1996) all find a significant negative
announcement effect in the order of –2% for their samples of US con-
vertibles, Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) report an abnormal stock
price reaction of only –1.2% for their sample of UK convertibles, and
Burcalu (2000) detects an announcement effect of only –0.22% for
his sample of French convertibles. De Roon and Veld (1998) even
report a (non-significant) positive announcement return of 0.16% for
their sample of Dutch convertible debt offerings.
The popular financial press offers a potential explanation for this
divergence in the event study results obtained by European and US
studies, being that convertibles issued by European firms tend to be
more debt-like in nature than convertibles issued by US firms. For
example, in the article ‘2001 ways to use convertibles’ published in
Corporate Finance (February 2001), we read:
‘In the US, convertibles have been – and still are – an equity play. In Europe,
a different attitude prevails. Convertibles are considered debt, both by the
investors that buy them and the investment banks that market them.’
Since the pecking-order model of Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts
that relatively more debt-like securities should be accompanied by less
negative announcement returns, this might explain why European con-
vertibles are generally found to induce less unfavorable stockholder reac-
tions than US convertibles. However, surprisingly, the validity of the
common perception that European convertibles have a larger debt com-
ponent than US convertibles has never been formally examined thus far.
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Our paper provides an answer to this gap in the empirical finance
literature by conducting an in-depth analysis of the differences
between European and US convertibles. First, we investigate the secu-
rity design differences across European and US convertible debt
issues. Our evidence confirms that European convertible debt is effec-
tively structured to be more debt-like than US convertible debt. In a
next step, we examine the differences in the stockholder reactions to
European and US convertible debt announcements. In line with the
existing empirical evidence outlined above, we find that European
convertible debt announcements induce a significantly less negative
abnormal stock price effect than US convertible debt announcements.
Subsequently, we explore several potential explanations for the dif-
ferent security design of European and US convertibles. Since Euro-
pean convertibles have a larger debt component than US convertibles,
we argue that European convertible debt issuers should have smaller
debt-related costs than their US-based counterparts. Our results sup-
port this hypothesis. In addition, we find that the relatively more debt-
like nature of European convertibles may also partly be driven by non-
firm-related (i.e., demand-side or regulatory) differences between the
European and the US markets.
In the popular financial literature, it is often claimed that the dif-
ferences between the European and US convertible debt markets
should gradually diminish over time, because the European convert-
ible debt market is evolving towards the US convertible debt market.
For example, in the article ‘Changing the face of equity-linked
issuance’ published in Corporate Finance (August 2000), we read:
‘(…) the European convertibles market is shifting towards one which looks
much more like the US, which is dominated by smaller technology-oriented
companies and far less populated than Europe with top-rated blue chips.
(…) Bankers believe that Europe’s convertibles market is already develop-
ing in line with the US template.’
In contrast with this statement however, we find that most of the dif-
ferences in the European and US convertible debt (issuer) character-
istics uncovered by our study are persistent (and sometimes even
increasing) over our research window 1990-2002.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion describes our sample selection procedure. Section III discusses the
security design differences across European and US convertible debt.
Section IV compares the stockholder reactions induced by the
announcements of European and US convertibles. Section V presents
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our analysis of firm-related and institutional differences across the
European and the US convertible debt market. Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE
The sample of European convertible debt issues used in this study was
constructed by retrieving a list of all convertible debt offerings made
by Western European companies during the period 1990-2002 from
Bloomberg Thomson Financial. We thus obtained an initial dataset of
524 observations. Subsequently, we applied the following criteria to
select offerings for inclusion in our final sample:
– The offering must be made by an industrial company (exclude
financial companies and regulated public utilities) headquartered in
Western Europe (exclude subsidiaries of non-Western European
firms);
– The offering must be convertible in the issuing firm’s stock (exclude
exchangeables);
– Security design data must be available on Bloomberg;
– The offering announcement date must be available on Bloomberg,
and should not include other confounding corporate event
announcements (e.g., announcements of dividend payments or other
security offerings);1
– The issuing firm’s daily stock price data for the full calendar year
preceding the announcement date must be available on Datastream;
– The issuing firm’s accounting data for the fiscal year-end immedi-
ately prior to the announcement date must be available on Data-
stream.
The final Western European convertible debt sample contains
222 offerings made by 168 different firms.2
The sample of US convertibles was constructed in the same man-
ner. Our initial US convertible debt dataset consisted of a list of 1.092
convertibles retrieved from Bloomberg. After applying analogous
selection criteria as the ones outlined above, we obtained a final sam-
ple of 670 offerings made by 486 different US-based firms.
Table 1 presents the number of European and US convertible debt
offerings sorted by issue year. We see that the temporal dispersion of
our two convertible debt samples is largely similar. More particularly,
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both in the European and in the US sample, there is a clustering of
offerings towards the end of the research period: approximately 50%
of the sample issues are made during the window 1999-2002.
III. DIFFERENCES IN SECURITY DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
ACROSS EUROPEAN AND US CONVERTIBLES
A. Measurement
In this section, we test whether European convertible debt offerings
have a larger debt component than US convertibles (as is often sug-
gested in the popular financial press). When firms issue convertibles,
they can decide how debt-like or equity-like the convertible debt will
be by specifying several security design parameters, such as the
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TABLE 1
European and US convertible debt offerings sorted per issue year
Number of offerings (Cumulative %)
European convertibles US convertibles
1990 4 (1.80%) 18 (2.69%)
1991 8 (5.41%) 34 (7.76%)
1992 7 (8.56%) 32 (12.54%)
1993 17 (16.22%) 43 (18.96%)
1994 18 (24.32%) 16 (21.34%)
1995 4 (26.13%) 27 (25.37%)
1996 8 (29.73%) 64 (34.93%)
1997 22 (39.64%) 76 (46.27%)
1998 24 (50.45%) 44 (52.84%)
1999 28 (63.06%) 49 (60.15%)
2000 36 (79.28%) 89 (73.43%)
2001 26 (90.99%) 124 (91.94%)
2002 20 (100.00%) 54 (100.00%)
Total 222 670
The European convertible debt sample consists of 222 offerings made by Wes-
tern European industrial firms between 1990 and 2002. The US convertible debt
sample consists of 670 offerings made by US industrial firms between 1990 and
2002.
conversion premium, the convertible debt maturity, the level of post-
conversion equity dilution and callability. Ceteris paribus, convert-
ibles with a high conversion premium are more debt-like in nature,
since they have a small probability of ever being converted into equity.
Conversely, convertibles with a long maturity are more equity-like in
nature, because they have a higher likelihood of becoming in the
money over their lifetime (and hence, a higher conversion probabil-
ity). The level of post-conversion equity dilution (calculated as the
number of new shares issued upon conversion divided by the number
of new shares plus the number of old shares outstanding at fiscal-year
end before the announcement date) is also positively related to the
equity component embedded in the convertibles. Lastly, callable con-
vertibles are more equity-like in nature than their non-callable coun-
terparts. The reason is that, by calling its outstanding convertible debt,
the issuing firm can force the convertible bondholders to convert their
bonds into equity before maturity.3 Hence, callable convertibles will
be converted into equity in more states of the world than non-callable
convertibles (Nyborg (1995)).4
All of these security design measures however have the disadvan-
tage that they only capture one specific aspect of the convertible debt
design. Therefore, we also include a more comprehensive convertible
debt design measure in our analysis, being the convertible debt delta
(also used by Burcalu (2000)). The delta measures the sensitivity of
the convertible bond value to its underlying common stock value.
It simultaneously takes into account the convertible debt maturity and
the conversion premium (and hence also the level of post-conversion
equity dilution, since this variable is inversely related to the conver-
sion premium), thereby providing a more complete picture of the con-
vertible debt design than the individual security features outlined
above. More particularly, under the standard Black and Scholes (1973)
assumptions, the delta can be represented by the following formula:
(1)
With δ: Continuously compounded dividend yield for the fiscal
year-end immediately preceding the announcement date;
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T: Initial convertible debt maturity (expressed in years);
N(.): Cumulative probability under a standard normal distribu-
tion function;
S: Price of the underlying stock measured one week prior to
the announcement date (in order to abstract from the
impact that the convertible debt announcement might have
on the issuing firm’s stock price);
X: Conversion price;
r: For the European convertibles: the continuously com-
pounded yield on a 5-year German Treasury Bond (mea-
sured on the announcement date); for the US convertibles:
the continuously compounded yield on a 10-year US Trea-
sury Bond (measured on the announcement date);5
σ: Stock return volatility per annum, estimated from the con-
tinuously compounded equity return measured over the
period 240 to 40 trading days prior to the announcement
date.
A high delta (approaching 1) means that the convertible bond is
very sensitive to its underlying common stock and subsequently has
a large equity component. Inversely, a low delta value indicates that
the convertible is structured to be highly debt-like in nature.
To assess the statistical significance of the differences between the
continuous security design measures across the European and the US
sample, we use a parametric two-sample t-test and a non-parametric
two-sample Wilcoxon test. The continuous security design character-
istics are all winsorized at the 99th and the 1st percentile, in order to
reduce the influence of potential outliers.6 To determine the statistical
significance of the difference in the proportion of callable convert-
ibles across the European and the US sample in turn, we use a χ2-test
statistic (i.e., the outcome of a contingency table analysis).
B. Findings
Table 2 presents our univariate test results on the security design char-
acteristics of European versus US convertibles. In Panel A, we report
full-sample test results. In Panels B and C, we provide separate test
results for convertibles issued in the window 1990-1998 and for con-
vertibles issued in the window 1999-2002, respectively. By means of
this split-sample analysis, we want to examine whether the differences
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TABLE 2
Differences in security design characteristics across European and
US convertibles
Panel A: Research window 1990-2002 (full sample)
Security design European US Test statistics
measure convertibles convertibles for differences
(1) (2) across (1) and (2)
Conversion Average: 1.17 Average: 1.23 t-test: –3.76*** 
premium Median: 1.17 Median: 1.21 Wilcoxon test: 
–2.94***
Maturity (years) Average: 6.71 Average: 10.25 t-test:  –11.17*** 
Median: 5.48 Median: 7.03 Wilcoxon test:  
–9.87***
Post-conversion Average: 0.10 Average: 0.12 t-test:  –1.92* 
equity dilution Median: 0.07 Median: 0.10 Wilcoxon test:  
–4.44***
Call dummy = 1 78.38% 98.36% x2-test: 107.77***
Delta Average: 0.63 Average: 0.82 t-test:  –16.73*** 
Median: 0.63 Median: 0.84 Wilcoxon test:  
–15.39***
Panel B: Convertibles issued between 1990 and 1998
Security design European US Test statistics 
measure convertibles convertibles for differences
(1) (2) across (1) and (2)
Conversion Average: 1.15 Average: 1.23 t-test: –3.59*** 
premium Median: 1.14 Median: 1.20 Wilcoxon test: 
–5.05***
Maturity (years) Average: 7.77 Average: 9.77 t-test: –4.92***
Median: 7.00 Median: 9.89 Wilcoxon test: 
–4.48***
Post-conversion Average: 0.10 Average: 0.12 t-test: –1.79*
equity dilution Median: 0.06 Median: 0.11 Wilcoxon test: 
–4.93***
Call dummy = 1 81.25% 99.72% χ2-test: 64.51***
Delta Average: 0.58 Average: 0.79 t-test: –11.86***
Median: 0.58 Median: 0.81 Wilcoxon test: 
–11.05***
between European and US convertibles tend to become smaller over
time (as is often claimed in the popular financial press).7
Our full-sample results presented in Panel A provide strong support
for the common belief that European convertibles are more debt-like
in nature than US convertibles. More specifically, we see that the
maturity, the level of post-conversion equity dilution, the proportion
of callable offerings and the delta (i.e., our main equity component
measure) are all significantly smaller for European convertibles than
for US convertibles. Our only finding that is inconsistent with the
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Panel C: Convertibles issued between 1999 and 2002
Security design European US Test statistics 
measure convertibles convertibles for differences
(1) (2) across (1) and (2)
Conversion Average: 1.20 Average: 1.22 t-test: –1.79*
premium Median: 1.24 Median: 1.22 Wilcoxon test: 0.66
Maturity (years) Average: 5.63 Average: 10.78 t-test: –10.89***
Median: 5.00 Median: 7.00 Wilcoxon test: 
–9.73***
Post-conversion Average: 0.10 Average: 0.12 t-test: –1.69*
equity dilution Median: 0.08 Median: 0.10 Wilcoxon test: 
–2.00**
Call dummy = 1 75.45% 96.84% χ2-test: 47.03***
Delta Average: 0.66 Average: 0.85 t-test: –13.60***
Median: 0.66 Median: 0.87 Wilcoxon test: 
–11.57***
Conversion premium is the conversion price divided by the stock price measured
one week prior to the announcement date. Maturity denotes the initial maturity
of the offering. Post-conversion equity dilution is the number of shares issued
assuming full conversion of the convertibles divided by (1) the total number of
shares outstanding at fiscal year-end before the offering announcement and (2) the
number of shares issued assuming full conversion. Call dummy equals one for
callable bonds, and equals zero for non-callable bonds. Delta measures the sen-
sitivity of the convertible debt value to its underlying common stock value
(cf. Equation (1)).
* Significant at the 0.10 level
** Significant at the 0.05 level
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
popular claim that European convertibles have a larger debt compo-
nent than US convertibles is that the conversion premium for Euro-
pean convertibles is significantly smaller than the conversion premium
for US convertibles. Further in the paper, we will provide a possible
explanation for this last result.
A comparison of the split-sample test results reported in Panels B and
C reveals that the differences in the security design characteristics of
European and US convertibles remain stable over time. It should how-
ever be noted that both European and US convertibles tend to become
substantially more equity-like over the last part of our research window.
More specifically, the average delta of the European convertibles
increases from 0.58 in the first subperiod to 0.66 in the second subpe-
riod (t-statistic for difference in the average delta values across the two
subperiods equals 6.83, p-value < 0.0001), and the average delta of the
US convertibles rises from 0.79 in the first subperiod to 0.85 in the sec-
ond subperiod (t-statistic for difference in the average delta values
across the two subperiods equals 3.92, p-value = 0.0001).
IV. DIFFERENCES IN STOCKHOLDER REACTIONS TO
EUROPEAN AND US CONVERTIBLE DEBT
ANNOUNCEMENTS
A. Testable hypothesis
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, in an environment with asym-
metric information about firm value, stockholders will interpret risky
security offerings as a signal that the issuing firm is overvalued. As a
consequence, all risky security offering announcements are predicted
to have a negative influence on the issuing firm’s stock price. Never-
theless, the announcement effect associated with relatively more debt-
like securities should be less negative than the announcement effect
associated with relatively more equity-like securities. The reason is that
the payoffs of debt-like securities are less sensitive to firm value, so that
these offerings are less likely to be inspired by opportunistic issuer
motivations (i.e., taking advantage of a temporary firm overvaluation).
Since the previous section revealed that European convertibles have
a larger debt component than US convertibles, we thus expect the for-
mer securities to induce less negative stockholder reactions than the
latter securities.
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B. Measurement
To determine the abnormal stock returns at the announcements of Euro-
pean and US convertibles, we use standard event study methodology
as described in Dodd and Warner (1983). Our proxy for the market
index is the Datastream benchmark index for the country of domicile
of the issuing company. The Datastream benchmark indices are value-
weighted market indices calculated analogously for all countries, which
makes them very suitable for a cross-country analysis like ours. Our
results remain however virtually similar when we use other market
index proxies (e.g., market indices provided by the specific stock mar-
kets on which our sample firms are listed; a pan-European Datastream
benchmark index instead of different Datastream benchmark indices
for each of our Western European sample countries; etc.).8
According to Mikkelson and Partch (1986), event studies that exclu-
sively rely on a pre- or a post-event estimation window might yield
biased test results. Therefore, in line with Dann and Mikkelson (1984)
and Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2003), we estimate the market
model regressions over the combined pre- and post-event estimation
windows (–200,–61) and (61,200). Our test results are however insen-
sitive to the use of alternative estimation windows (e.g., the pre-event
window (–200,–61)).9
For assessing the statistical significance of the abnormal return esti-
mates within the European and the US convertible debt sample, we use
a Patell (1976) Z-test. Since daily abnormal returns are reported to be
highly non-normal in nature (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997)), we
cross-check the conclusions obtained by this parametric test by means of
a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Significance levels were
highly similar. For determining the abnormal return differences across the
European and US convertible debt sample in turn, we use a parametric
two-sample t-test and a non-parametric two-sample Wilcoxon test.
C. Findings
Table 3 provides an overview of the cumulative abnormal stock returns
computed over several windows surrounding the convertible debt
announcement date (= day 0).
Our full-sample analysis reported in Panel A indicates that both Euro-
pean and US convertible debt announcements induce a significant nega-
tive abnormal stock return. However, the announcement effect associated
543
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Daily abnormal stock returns around European and US convertible debt offering announcements
Panel A: Research window 1990-2002 (full sample)
Interval Average (median) AR % Negative Z-statistic Test statistics for differences
(%) AR’s across EU and US sample
1. Pre-announcement period window
(–60,–2) EU: 2.86 (3.97) 40.99 2.48** t-test: –6.11***
US: 14.29 (9.98) 29.15 11.80*** Wilcoxon test: –4.84***
2. Announcement period windows
(–1,0) EU: –1.18 (–1.09) 64.41 –4.14*** t-test: 5.01***
US: –2.97 (–2.54) 70.00 –16.59*** Wilcoxon test: 4.33***
0 EU: –1.34 (–1.08) 68.08 –7.59*** t-test: 2.00**
US: –1.87 (–1.86) 69.25 –14.66*** Wilcoxon test: 2.16**
(0,1) EU: –1.42 (–1.24) 64.41 –5.37*** t-test: 1.08
US: –1.78 (–1.84) 64.78 –10.39*** Wilcoxon test: 1.49
3. Post-announcement period window
(2,60) EU: –0.91 (–0.58) 51.35 –0.77 t-test: 0.27
US: –1.36 (0.84) 47.61 –1.00 Wilcoxon test: 0.49
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Panel B: Convertibles issued between 1990 and 1998
Interval Average (median) AR % Negative Z-statistic Test statistics for differences
(%) AR’s across EU and US sample
1. Pre-announcement period window
(–60,–2) EU: 2.81 (2.74) 41.96 1.41 t-test: –2.77***
US: 8.79 (8.11) 31.44 7.04*** Wilcoxon test: –3.04***
2. Announcement period windows
(–1,0) EU: –0.42 (–0.50) 61.61 –1.08 t-test: 3.75***
US: –1.91 (–1.84) 67.80 –9.76*** Wilcoxon test: 3.54***
0 EU: –0.49 (–0.55) 61.60 –3.16*** t-test: 2.17**
US: –1.14 (–1.48) 67.80 –7.63*** Wilcoxon test: 2.60***
(0,1) EU: –0.65 (–0.68) 60.71 –2.58*** t-test: 0.91
US: –1.06 (–1.45) 62.15 –5.27*** Wilcoxon test: 1.22
3. Post-announcement period window
(2,60) EU: –1.16 (–0.81) 51.79 –0.46 t-test: 0.82
US: –2.01 (–1.10) 51.69 –1.75* Wilcoxon test: 0.58
546 Panel C: Convertibles issued between 1999 and 2002
Interval Average (median) AR % Negative Z-statistic Test statistics for differences
(%) AR’s across EU and US sample
1. Pre-announcement period window
(–60,–2) EU: 2.90 (6.31) 40.00 2.10** t-test: –5.60***
US: 20.43 (13.63) 26.58 9.73*** Wilcoxon test: –4.04***
2. Announcement period windows
(–1,0) EU: –1.96 (–1.59) 67.27 –4.80*** t-test: 3.71***
US: –4.15 (–4.01) 72.47 –13.83*** Wilcoxon test: 3.05***
0 EU: –2.21 (–2.01) 74.55 –7.60*** t-test: 1.20
US: –2.69 (–2.67) 70.89 –13.28*** Wilcoxon test: 1.13
(0,1) EU: –2.20 (–1.85) 68.18 –5.03*** t-test: 0.22
US: –2.61 (–2.59) 67.72 –9.55*** Wilcoxon test: 1.09
3. Post-announcement period window
(2,60) EU: –0.66 (–0.57) 50.91 –0.62 t-test: 0.23
US: –0.48 (4.07) 43.04 –0.40 Wilcoxon test: 1.12
‘EU’ indicates the sample of European convertibles, ‘US’ indicates the sample of US convertibles. Abnormal stock returns are calcu-
lated by means of the market model, with the market index proxied by the Datastream benchmark index for the issuing firm’s country
of domicile. Market model regressions are estimated over the windows (–200,–61) and (61,200) relative to the announcement dates
retrieved from Bloomberg. All equity returns are continuously compounded and based on stock prices expressed in the local currency
of the issuing firm’s country of domicile.
* Significant at the 0.10 level
** Significant at the 0.05 level
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
with European convertibles is significantly less negative in windows
(–1,0) and (0) than the announcement effect associated with US convert-
ibles. This finding is in line with our testable hypothesis, as well as with
findings reported by previous European and US-based studies (cf. supra).
Our event study analysis also reveals that both European and US
convertible debt announcements are preceded by a significant positive
abnormal stock runup. Nevertheless, the stock runup prior to European
convertible debt announcements is significantly smaller than the stock
runup prior to US convertible debt announcements (i.e., 2.86% ver-
sus 14.29% on average). Over the post-announcement window (2,60),
we detect no abnormal stock price behavior in either of our two con-
vertible debt samples.
In Panels B and C, we report split-sample abnormal return estimates
for convertibles issued prior to 1999 and for convertibles issued from
1999 onwards. Our evidence indicates that the difference between the
day-0 announcement effects of European and US convertibles
decreases over time. In particular, whereas the difference in the day-
0 abnormal returns is significant at less than 5% during the period
1990-1998 (Panel B), it is no longer significant during the window
1999-2002 (Panel C). The difference between the abnormal returns
measured over the two-day event window (-1,0) however remains sig-
nificant during our four last sample years.
It is worth noting that the announcement effects associated with both
European and US convertible debt offerings become considerably more
negative towards the end of our research window. More specifically, the
day-0 abnormal returns for the European (US) sample drop from –0.49%
(–1.14%) on average over the window 1990-1998 to –2.21% (–2.69%)
on average over the window 1999-2002 (t-statistic for difference in the
day-0 announcement returns across the two subperiods equals 3.85 for
the European sample (p-value = 0.0002) and equals 4.13 for the US sam-
ple (p-value < 0.0001)). This is consistent with our earlier finding (cf. pre-
vious section) that both European and US convertible debt issues tend
to become significantly more equity-like over time.
V. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT
SECURITY DESIGN OF EUROPEAN AND US CONVERTIBLES
In Section III, we showed that European convertibles tend to have a
larger debt component than US convertibles. In this section, we
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explore some potential, non-mutually exclusive explanations for this
finding. First, we analyze the differences in the issuer characteristics
across our European and US convertible debt sample. Afterwards, we
examine whether the difference in the equity component size of Euro-
pean and US convertibles could be attributable to different institu-
tional features of the European and the US convertible debt markets.
A. Differences in issuer characteristics across the European and
the US convertible debt markets
1. Sectoral dispersion
In Table 4, we present the number (percentage) of European and US
convertible debt issuers sorted per sector. The sector classification is
based upon the FTSE World Actuaries sector codes (retrieved from
Datastream). The top five sectors of the European and the US con-
vertible debt issuer universe are printed in italic, with the sector’s posi-
tion added in parentheses.
Table 4 reveals that convertible debt issuance is not confined to a
specific industry sector: almost all FTSE sector codes are represented,
both in the European and in the US sample. Nevertheless, there seems
to be some industry clustering, especially in the I/T sector. More par-
ticularly, the sectors ‘I/T hardware’ and ‘Software and computer ser-
vices’ account for 16.86% of the European convertible debt issuers
and for 28.60% of the US convertible debt issuers.
The overlap between the top five sectors of our European and US
sample is very limited (i.e., only with respect to the two I/T-related
sectors). In the European sample, there is a larger representation of
companies from Old Economy sectors such as ‘Construction and
building materials’ (8.72% of the European issuers versus 1.44% of the
US issuers) and ‘Food producers and processors’ (6.40% of the Euro-
pean issuers versus 1.44% of the US issuers). To the extent that Old
Economy firms have a larger debt capacity than New Economy firms
(as documented e.g. by Houben and Kakes (2002)), this could explain
why European convertibles tend to have a larger debt component than
their US-based counterparts.
In the popular financial press, it is often stated that the European
convertible debt issuer universe is moving towards one that is look-
ing more like the US, i.e. towards more technology-oriented firms (cf.
quote provided in the introduction). In order to check whether this is
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effectively the case, we calculated the evolution in the relative im-
portance of each sector from the period 1990-1998 to the period 
1999-2002. Our results are represented in the ‘Evolution’ columns of
Table 4.
On the whole, we can conclude from these columns that there are
no drastic shifts in the sectoral dispersion of our sample firms: the
recorded percentage changes are mostly very small. For the European
sample, we see that there effectively is an increase in the relative
importance of technology-oriented sectors such as ‘Software and com-
puter services’, ‘Telecommunication services’ and ‘Media and enter-
tainment’, and this at the expense of more traditional sectors such as
‘Forestry and paper’ and ‘Transport’. However, in the US sample, we
observe a similar trend. More specifically, the relative importance of
technology-driven industries such as ‘Pharmaceuticals and biotech’
and ‘I/T hardware’ sharply increases, whereas Old Economy sectors
such as ‘Household goods and textiles’ lose weight. Hence, we can
conclude that there is no convergence between the European and the
US convertible debt market with respect to the sectoral dispersion of
the issuing firms, as both markets seem to be moving in the same
direction.
2. Debt-related financing costs
a. Measurement
In this paragraph, we analyze the differences in firm-specific debt
financing costs across European and US convertible debt issuers. Since
convertibles issued by European firms tend to have a larger debt com-
ponent than convertibles issued by US firms, we expect the former
firms to have smaller debt-related costs than the latter.
The literature distinguishes three kinds of debt-related financing
costs, i.e. financial distress costs, adverse selection costs and moral
hazard costs. Financial distress costs arise when a firm is close to
bankruptcy due to an excessive debt level. They consist of trustee fees,
legal fees and other costs of reorganization or bankruptcy (Copeland
and Weston (1992)). Debt-related adverse selection costs are present
when there is asymmetric information about the current and future
risk of the issuing firm. As a result of this risk uncertainty, new
debtholders will require an additional lemon’s premium over the inter-
est rate that they would normally ask if there was perfect information
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European and US convertible debt issuers divided per sector
Sector European issuers US issuers
Total sample Evolution Total sample Evolution
Aerospace and defense 2 (1.16%) +2.13% 7 (1.44%) –0.66%
Automobiles and parts 7 (4.07%) –1.86% 9 (1.85%) +0.48%
Beverages 4 (2.33%) +2.18% 0 (0.00%) –
Chemicals 3 (1.74%) –0.96% 4 (0.82%) –1.44%
Construction and building materials 15 (8.72%) (2) –2.71% 7 (1.44%) +0.08%
Distributors 0 (0.00%) – 0 (0.00%) –
Diversified industrial 3 (1.74%) –3.03% 4 (0.82%) –0.70%
Electronic and electric equipment 8 (4.65%) –2.87% 16 (3.29%) +0.53%
Engineering and machinery 14 (8.14%) (3) –0.63% 17 (3.50%) +0.91%
Food and drug retailers 1 (0.58%) +0.05% 9 (1.85%) –2.13%
Food producers and processors 11 (6.40%) (4) +0.38% 7 (1.44%) +0.30%
Forestry and paper 5 (2.91%) –5.05% 2 (0.41%) +0.02%
General retailers 9 (5.23%) –1.81% 25 (5.14%) –0.11%
Healthcare 3 (1.74%) +1.12% 33 (6.79%) (5) –3.38%
Household goods and textiles 6 (3.49%) +0.16% 17 (3.50%) –3.53%
I/T hardware 10 (5.81%) (5) –0.74% 85 (17.49%) (1) +6.85%
Leisure and hotels 8 (4.65%) +0.27% 21 (4.32%) –3.49%
Media and entertainment 11 (6.40%) (4) +2.45% 20 (4.12%) +3.21%
Mining 1 (0.58%) +1.06% 4 (0.82%) –1.06%
Oil and gas 5 (2.91%) +3.25% 25 (5.14%) –2.70%
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Packaging 0 (0.00%) – 0 (0.00%) –
Personal care and household products 1 (0.58%) –1.01% 2 (0.41%) +0.02%
Pharmaceuticals and biotech 4 (2.33%) +0.11% 47 (9.67%) (3) +12.00%
Software and computer services 19 (11.05%) (1) +5.80% 54 (11.11%) (2) +3.92%
Steel and other metals 5 (2.91%) +2.24% 1 (0.21%) +0.38%
Support services 3 (1.74%) –0.96% 37 (7.61%) (4) –5.91%
Telecommunication services 6 (3.49%) +3.30% 20 (4.12%) –0.89%
Tobacco 0 (0.00%) – 1 (0.21%) +0.38%
Transport 8 (4.65%) –2.87% 12 (2.47%) –2.47%
Total 172 0.00% 486 0.00%
The European sample consists of 172 different Western European firms that issued convertibles between 1990 and 2002. The US
sample consists of 468 different US firms that issued convertibles between 1990 and 2002. The sector classification is based upon the
FTSE World Actuaries sector codes. The top five sectors (i.e., the sectors with the largest issuer representation) for the European and
the US sample are printed in italic, with the sector’s position added in parentheses. The columns labeled ‘Total sample’ describe the
sector classification of all sample firms. The columns labeled ‘Evolution’ describe the evolution (% increase (+) / % decrease (–)) in
the proportion of European and US sample firms classified in each sector from the period 1990 – 1998 to the period 1999 – 2002.
(Brennan and Schwartz (1988)). Debt-related moral hazard costs in
turn arise because debt contracts may give stockholders an incentive
to invest suboptimally. More specifically, debt may either induce
stockholders to overinvest in projects with a negative NPV (i.e., the
asset substitution problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976))
or to underinvest in projects with a positive NPV (i.e., the debt over-
hang problem described by Myers (1977)). Provided that debtholders
correctly anticipate these harmful investment incentives, stockholders
will have to bear the debt-related moral hazard costs in the form of a
higher risk premium on the corporate debt.
In our empirical tests, we use the following proxy variables for cap-
turing the debt-related problems described above. All accounting num-
bers are measured at fiscal year-end preceding the convertible issue.
First, in line with Mayers (1998) and Lewis et al. (1999), we include
the leverage ratio, calculated as the ratio of long term debt to total
assets. Firms with a high leverage ratio are hypothesized to have a
high probability of financial distress, and thus a large cost of attract-
ing new debt capital. Our second debt cost proxy (also used by Marsh
(1982) and Lewis et al. (2003)) is the daily stock return volatility,
measured over the window (-240,-40) relative to the convertible debt
announcement date. Firms with volatile stock returns tend to have a
high operational and financial risk, and thus a high likelihood of finan-
cial distress. Moreover, for these firms, there is a large degree of
uncertainty about firm risk, resulting in high adverse selection costs
(Brennan and Schwartz (1988)). As a last debt cost measure, we
include the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (also used by MacKie-
Mason (1990)). According to Myers (1977), debt-related over- and
underinvestment problems should be less severe when firm value
depends heavily on committed assets in place, thus leaving less room
for discretionary managerial investment decisions. Hence, the fixed
assets ratio serves as an (inverse) proxy for the level of debt-related
moral hazard costs associated with our sample firms.
b. Findings
In Table 5, we report our univariate test results on the differences in
the debt-related costs associated with European and US convertible
debt issuers.
Panel A reveals that our European sample firms have a significantly
smaller leverage ratio and stock return volatility and a significantly
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TABLE 5
Differences in debt-related costs across European and US convertible debt
issuers
Panel A: Research window 1990-2002 (full sample)
Variable European US Test statistics for
convertibles convertibles differences across
(1) (2) (1) and (2)
Long term debt/TA Average: 0.19 Average: 0.21 t-test: –1.84*
Median: 0.15 Median: 0.18 Wilcoxon test: 
–2.28**
Stock return Average: 0.03 Average: 0.04 t-test: –11.63***
volatility Median: 0.02 Median: 0.03 Wilcoxon test: 
–10.14***
Fixed assets/TA (–) Average: 0.31 Average: 0.27 t-test: 2.19**
Median: 0.27 Median: 0.21 Wilcoxon test: 
2.36**
Panel B: Convertibles issued between 1990 and 1998
Variable European US Test statistics for
convertibles convertibles differences across
(1) (2) (1) and (2)
Long term debt/TA Average: 0.16 Average: 0.21 t-test: –2.93***
Median: 0.14 Median: 0.18 Wilcoxon test: 
–2.14**
Stock return Average: 0.02 Average: 0.03 t-test: –11.25***
volatility Median: 0.02 Median: 0.03 Wilcoxon test: 
–9.65***
Fixed assets/TA (–) Average: 0.34 Average: 0.30 t-test: 1.72*
Median: 0.32 Median: 0.23 Wilcoxon test: 
2.22**
higher proportion of fixed assets than our US sample firms. We thus
obtain strong support for our hypothesis that European convertible
debt issuers should have smaller debt-related costs than US convert-
ible debt issuers.
It should be noted that, according to the signaling model of Bren-
nan and Kraus (1987), the conversion premium is positively related to
the stock return volatility of the issuing firm. Hence, our earlier find-
ing that US convertibles tend to have a significantly higher conversion
premium (cf. Section III) could be explained by the fact that US
issuers have a significantly higher stock return volatility than their
European counterparts.10
In Panels B and C, we provide split-sample univariate test results
for convertibles issued before 1999 and for convertibles issued from
1999 onwards. We see that both European and US convertible debt
issuers tend to have higher debt-related costs during the last four sam-
ple years (changes in all debt-related cost proxies for the European
sample are significant at less than 1%, and changes in the stock return
volatility and the fixed assets ratio for the US sample are significant
at less than 1%).11 This could explain our earlier finding that both
European and US convertible debt offerings become significantly
more equity-like towards the end of our sample period (cf. Section
III). The debt-related costs of the European convertible debt issuers
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Panel C: Convertibles issued between 1999 and 2002
Variable European US Test statistics for
convertibles convertibles differences across
(1) (2) (1) and (2)
Long term debt/TA Average: 0.21 Average: 0.21 t-test: 0.02
Median: 0.17 Median: 0.17 Wilcoxon test: 
–1.38
Stock return Average: 0.03 Median: 0.05 t-test: –9.14***
volatility Average: 0.05 Median: 0.04 Wilcoxon test: 
–7.41***
Fixed assets/TA (–) Average: 0.27 Average: 0.24 t-test: 1.44
Median: 0.22 Median: 0.18 Wilcoxon test: 1.05
Long term debt/TA is debt with a maturity > 1 year divided by the book value
of total assets, measured at fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date. Stock
return volatility denotes the standard deviation of the daily stock returns estima-
ted over the window (–240, –40) relative to the announcement date. Fixed
assets/TA is the amount of fixed assets divided by the book value of total assets,
measured at fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date.
* Significant at the 0.10 level
** Significant at the 0.05 level
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
however increase more strongly than the debt-related costs of the US
convertible debt issuers, so that the differences between the debt-
related costs associated with European and US issuers decrease over
time. In particular, whereas the differences between the leverage ratios
and the fixed assets ratios of European and US issuers are statistically
significant over the window 1990-1998 (Panel B), they are no longer
significant over the window 1999-2002 (Panel C).
It should be recalled that, unlike the differences in the debt cost
proxies, the difference in the equity component size of European and
US convertibles does not diminish over time (cf. Section III). We can
thus conclude that the different security design of European and US
convertible debt cannot solely be attributable to differences in debt-
related financing costs across European and US issuers.
3. Equity-related financing costs
a. Measurement
Another plausible explanation for the relatively more debt-like struc-
ture of European convertibles is that European convertible debt issuers
face higher equity-related adverse selection costs than US convertible
debt issuers. As noted above, equity-related adverse selection costs
arise from the fact that, in an environment with asymmetric informa-
tion about firm value, stockholders automatically infer from an
equity(-linked) security offering that the firm is overvalued. As a
result, firm value drops at the announcement of equity(-linked) secu-
rity issues (Myers and Majluf (1984)). The higher the perceived level
of firm overvaluation, the more severe this equity-related adverse
selection problem.
In order to test the hypothesis that European convertible debt
issuers have higher equity-related financing costs than US convert-
ible debt issuers, we use the following proxy variables. Again, all
accounting numbers are measured at fiscal year-end preceding the
convertible issue. First, we include the amount of slack capital, cal-
culated as the ratio of cash plus marketable securities divided by total
assets. When a firm with sufficient slack capital issues risky securi-
ties, stockholders are more likely to infer that this firm is overvalued,
since undervalued firms would rather resort to internal slack financ-
ing (according to the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf
(1984)). Therefore, firms with a large amount of slack capital are
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expected to incur high equity-related adverse selection costs (de Jong
and Veld (2001)). As a second equity cost proxy, we use the raw pre-
announcement stock price runup, measured over the window (–75,–1)
relative to the announcement date. Stockholders may interpret a large
pre-announcement stock runup as a signal of opportunistic timing
behavior, which again results in high equity-related financing costs
(Lucas and McDonald (1990)).
On the other hand, Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that the
equity-related adverse selection problem should be less severe for
offerings announced after a high stock market runup, since informa-
tion asymmetries for the economy as a whole tend to be smaller dur-
ing market expansions. We therefore use the pre-announcement mar-
ket runup (calculated as the return on the Datastream benchmark
index for the issuing firm’s country of domicile, realized over
the window (–75,–1) relative to the announcement date) as a third
(inverse) proxy for the level of equity financing costs faced by our
sample firms. Our last equity cost measure is the relative issue size,
calculated as the issue size divided by the market value of equity.
According to the model of Krasker (1986) (i.e., a generalization of
the Myers and Majluf (1984) model), this variable should be a direct
measure for the level of equity-related adverse selection costs
incurred by the issuing firm. All of the equity-related cost proxies
included in our study are widely used in the literature (see e.g. de
Jong and Veld (2001) and Lewis et al. (2003)).
b. Findings
Table 6 presents our univariate test results on the differences in equity-
related financing costs across European and US convertible debt issu-
ing firms.
Panel A of the table indicates that European convertible debt issuers
actually have significantly smaller values on all of our equity-related
cost measures, except for the pre-announcement market runup. Hence,
we can conclude that the relatively more debt-like design of European
convertibles can not be attributed to the fact that European issuers
face higher equity financing costs than US issuers.
In Panels B and C, we again report split-sample univariate test
results for convertibles issued prior to 1999 and for convertibles issued
from 1999 onwards. The panels reveal that the differences in the
equity-related cost measures for European and US issuers are stable
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over our research window: only the difference in the relative issue
sizes becomes insignificant during the window 1999-2002. In contrast
with the debt-related cost proxies, there is no general time trend in the
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TABLE 6
Differences in equity – related costs across European and us convertible
debt issuers
Panel A: Research window 1990-2002 (full sample)
Variable European US Test statistics for
convertibles convertibles differences across
(1) (2) (1) and (2)
Slack Average: 0.12 Average: 0.20 t-test: –8.17***
Median: 0.09 Median: 0.11 Wilcoxon test: 
–2.71***
Stock runup Average: 0.06 Average: 0.18 t-test: –4.80***
edian: 0.08 Median: 0.14 Wilcoxon test: 
–4.27***
Market runup Average: 0.05 Average: 0.03 t-test: 1.59
Median: 0.04 Median: 0.04 Wilcoxon test: 1.36
Issue size/MV equity Average: 0.17 Average: 0.19 t-test: –2.09**
Median: 0.13 Median: 0.15 Wilcoxon test: 
–2.59***
Panel B: Convertibles issued between 1990 and 1998
Variable European US Test statistics for
convertibles convertibles differences across
(1) (2) (1) and (2)
Slack Average: 0.11 Average: 0.16 t-test: –3.49***
Median: 0.09 Median: 0.08 Wilcoxon test: 0.39
Stock runup Average: 0.09 Average: 0.15 t-test: –2.40**
Median: 0.08 Median: 0.14 Wilcoxon test: 
–2.54***
Market runup Average: 0.06 Average: 0.07 t-test: –0.86
Median: 0.07 Median: 0.06 Wilcoxon test: 0.54
Issue size/MV equity Average: 0.17 Average: 0.25 t-test: –4.04***
Median: 0.15 Median: 0.20 Wilcoxon test: 
–4.23***
values of the equity-related cost proxies. More particularly, both for
the European and the US sample firms, some proxy variables (e.g.,
slack capital) show increasing equity-related costs, whereas other
proxy variables (e.g., relative issue size) show decreasing equity-
related costs over time.
4. Multivariate analysis
a. Measurement
In order to test the robustness of our different univariate test
results, we also conduct a multivariate logistic regression analysis of
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Panel C: Convertibles issued between 1999 and 2002
Variable European US Test statistics for
convertibles convertibles differences across
(1) (2) (1) and (2)
Slack Average: 0.12 Average: 0.27 t-test: –7.89***
Median: 0.08 Median: 0.18 Wilcoxon test: 
–4.23***
Stock runup Average: 0.04 Average: 0.21 t-test: –4.24***
Median: 0.06 Median: 0.12 Wilcoxon test: 
–2.79***
Market runup Average: 0.03 Average: –0.01 t-test: 3.53***
Median: 0.02 Median: –0.01 Wilcoxon test: 
3.40***
Issue size/MV equity Average: 0.16 Average: 0.11 t-test: 1.40
Median: 0.11 Median: 0.11 Wilcoxon test: 0.72
Slack denotes the sum of cash and marketable securities divided by total assets,
measured at fiscal year-end prior to the announcement date. Stock runup is the
cumulative raw stock return realized over the window (–75,–1) relative to the
announcement date. Market runup is the cumulative return on the Datastream
benchmark index for the issuing firm’s country of domicile, measured over the
window (–75,–1) relative to the announcement date. Issue size/MV equity is the
issue size divided by the market value of common equity, measured one week
prior to the announcement date.
* Significant at the 0.10 level
** Significant at the 0.05 level
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
the differences in the characteristics of European and US convert-
ible debt issuers. The dependent variable of this regression analysis
equals one for convertibles issued by European firms, and equals
zero for convertibles issued by US firms. As independent variables,
we use all of the debt- and/or equity-related cost proxies discussed
above. In addition, we include two control variables that could act
as proxies for both debt- and equity-related financing costs. First, we
control for the issuing firm’s growth opportunities with the market
to book ratio, calculated as the sum of total assets plus the market
value of common equity minus the book value of common equity
divided by total assets. Firms with many growth opportunities are
more difficult to value, which results in high debt-related financial
distress costs and equity-related adverse selection costs (Lewis et
al. (2003)). Debt-related over- and underinvestment problems may
also be larger for firms with many growth options, because stock-
holders and bondholders may disagree over the optimal exercise of
the options (Barclay and Smith (1995)). Hence, the market to book
ratio acts as a proxy for both debt- and equity-related financing
costs.
As a second control variable, we include the issuing firm size, mea-
sured by the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets
(expressed in constant December 2002 dollars by means of the IMF
monthly Consumer Price Index for Europe and for the US). Since both
debt-related financial distress costs and equity-related adverse selec-
tion costs should be smaller for large companies (Krishnaswami and
Yaman (2004)), firm size acts as an inverse proxy for the level of
external financing costs in general.
b. Findings
Table 7 reports our logistic regression results. We see that these results
largely confirm the findings obtained through the separate univariate
tests. The only differences are that the fixed assets/total assets ratio
becomes insignificant, whereas the market runup becomes significant.
The latter variable is estimated with a positive coefficient, which again
indicates that European convertible debt issuers face smaller equity-
related costs than US convertible debt issuers. The two control vari-
ables have insignificant regression parameters.
On the whole, our analysis of the differences in the characteristics
of European and US convertible debt issuers reveals that US
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TABLE 7
Logistic regression analysis of differences in firm characteristics across
European and US convertible debt issuers
Independent variables Parameter estimate
(χ2-statistic)
Intercept –1.349
(1.98)
Proxies for debt-related costs
Long term debt/TA –1.259***
(4.85)
Stock return volatility –56.040***
(45.84)
Fixed assets/TA (–) –0.164
(0.15)
Proxies for equity-related costs
Slack –1.191*
(–3.13)
Stock runup –1.830***
(21.43)
Market runup 2.602**
(5.51)
Issue size/MV equity –1.625***
(6.42)
Control variables
Market to book ratio –0.047
(1.62)
Ln(total assets) 0.023
(0.16)
McFadden’s R2 15.88%
N 880
The dependent variable equals one for convertibles issued by European firms, and
equals zero for convertibles issued by US firms. All firm-specific independent
variables are measured at fiscal year-end prior to the convertible debt announ-
cement date, unless otherwise indicated. Long term debt/TA is debt with a matu-
rity > 1 year divided by total assets. Stock return volatility denotes the standard
deviation of the daily stock returns estimated over the window (–240, –40) rela-
tive to the announcement date. Fixed assets/TA is the ratio of fixed assets divi-
ded by total assets. Slack denotes the sum of cash and marketable securities
divided by total assets. Stock runup is the cumulative raw stock return realized
over the window (–75,–1) relative to the announcement date. Market runup is
the cumulative return on the Datastream benchmark index for the issuing firm’s
country of domicile, measured over the window (–75,–1) relative to the
convertible debt issuers face both higher debt- and equity-related
financing costs than their European counterparts. Hence, the relatively
more equity-like design of US convertibles remains an unresolved
issue. One plausible explanation for this finding is that the debt-related
costs associated with US issuers are so important that these firms
mainly structure their convertible debt in order to mitigate these costs,
even at the expense of incurring some equity-related adverse selection
problems. This interpretation is in line with findings of a recent study
of Krishnaswami and Yaman (2004) on the security design determi-
nants of US convertible debt offerings.12
B. Institutional differences across the European and the US
convertible debt markets
Thus far, our search for an explanation of the security design differ-
ences across European and US convertibles has only focused on the
supply-side, i.e. on differences in the characteristics of European and
US convertible debt issuing firms. The popular financial press how-
ever suggests that the European and the US convertible debt markets
may also differ with respect to various non-firm-related aspects, e.g.
demand-side characteristics, tax and accounting regulations and other
institutional features. For example, in the article ‘2001 ways to use
convertibles’ published in Corporate Finance (February 2001), we
read:
‘Part of the difference (between European and US convertibles) is explained
in the mentality of the end-users. In the US (…), the investment banks that
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announcement date. Issue size/MV equity is the issue size divided by the mar-
ket value of common equity, measured one week prior to the announcement date.
Market to book ratio is calculated as (total assets + market value of common
equity measured one week prior to the announcement date – book value of com-
mon equity)/total assets. Ln(total assets) is the natural logarithm of the book
value of total assets, expressed in constant December 2002 dollars by means of
the IMF monthly Consumer Price Indices for Europe and the US. χ2-statistics are
inserted in parentheses.
* Significant at the 0.10 level
** Significant at the 0.05 level
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
deal in the product normally locate their teams on the same floor as the
stock guys, and investors generally come from an equity background. All this
makes perfect sense in a market where venture capital and investment risk-
taking is part and parcel of the culture. Unlike the US, most dedicated con-
vertible funds in Europe operate with a bond fund mentality – complete with
longer-term outlooks and conservative targets. European investors prefer
stronger, more established credits, and generally look upon the convertibles
market as an extension to the bond market, with the focus on debt service
and equity coverage.’
In order to examine whether the different security design of Euro-
pean and US convertibles may be driven by non-firm-related dif-
ferences between the European and the US convertible debt market,
we conduct the following cross-sectional OLS regression analysis.
As dependent variable, we include our main equity component mea-
sure, i.e. the convertible debt delta. As independent variables, we
include all of the firm-specific debt and equity cost measures dis-
cussed above, as well as a Europe dummy equal to one for Euro-
pean convertibles, and equal to zero for US convertibles. The
regression coefficient of the Europe dummy captures the impact of
non-issuer-related differences between the European and US con-
vertible debt market on the convertible debt equity component
size.13
Table 8 presents our regression results. Since White’s test rejects the
null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity, the reported t-statistics are
calculated by means of White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard
deviations.
The regression coefficients of the firm-specific variables indicate
that debt-related costs are more important convertible debt design
determinants than equity-related costs. More specifically, the para-
meter estimates of the leverage ratio and the stock return volatility are
significant and have the predicted positive impact on the convertible
debt equity component size. By contrast, none of the equity-related
cost proxies are significant.14 With respect to the control variables, we
find that firm size has a significant negative impact on the convertible
debt delta.
Our main variable of interest in this regression analysis however is
the Europe dummy. This variable is estimated with a highly signifi-
cant regression parameter. Hence, we obtain strong evidence for our
conjecture that the different security design of European and US con-
vertibles may partly be driven by non-issuer-related differences across
the European and the US convertible debt markets.
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TABLE 8
OLS regression analysis of impact of issuer characteristics and institutional
features on the size of the equity component of convertible debt
Independent variables Parameter estimate
(t-statistic)
Intercept 0.788***
(17.00)
Proxies for debt-related costs
Long term debt/TA 0.051***
(2.84)
Stock return volatility 3.964***
(13.67)
Fixed assets/TA (–) 0.034
(1.10)
Proxies for equity-related costs
Slack 0.008
(0.41)
Stock runup 0.014
(1.29)
Market runup –0.064
(–1.52)
Issue size/MV equity 0.020
(0.59)
Control variables
Market to book ratio 0.000
(0.43)
Ln(total assets) –0.010***
(–3.46)
Europe dummy –0.136***
(–12.50)
R2 adjusted 48.88%
N 868
The dependent variable used as proxy for the convertible debt equity component
size is the delta. The delta measures the sensitivity of the convertible debt value
to its underlying common stock value (cf. Equation (1)). All firm-specific inde-
pendent variables are measured at fiscal year-end prior to the convertible debt
announcement date, unless otherwise indicated. Long term debt/TA is debt with
a maturity > 1 year divided by total assets. Stock return volatility denotes the stan-
dard deviation of the daily stock returns estimated over the window (–240, –40)
relative to the announcement date. Fixed assets/TA is the ratio of fixed assets
divided by total assets. Slack denotes the sum of cash and marketable securities
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the popular financial press, it is often claimed that European con-
vertible debt is more debt-like in nature than US convertible debt.
This paper is the first to formally investigate the validity of this com-
mon belief. Our findings support that European convertibles effec-
tively have a larger debt component than US convertibles. In a next
step of our analysis, we compare the stockholder reactions upon the
announcements of European and US convertible debt offerings. We
find that European convertibles induce less negative abnormal stock
price reactions than US convertibles, which is consistent with the rel-
atively more debt-like structure of the former securities.
Subsequently, we examine some potential explanations for the dif-
ferent security design of European and US convertibles. Our analysis
of the differences in the firm characteristics reveals that US issuers
have both higher debt- and equity-related financing costs than Euro-
pean issuers. One plausible explanation for the relatively more equity-
like nature of US convertibles could then be that the debt-related prob-
lems associated with US issuers are much more severe than their
equity-related problems. As a result, US firms may design their con-
vertibles mainly in order to reduce debt-related costs, even at the
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divided by total assets. Stock runup is the cumulative raw stock return realized
over the window (–75,–1) relative to the announcement date. Market runup is the
cumulative return on the Datastream benchmark index for the issuing firm’s
country of domicile, measured over the window (–75,–1) relative to the announ-
cement date. Issue size/MV equity is the issue size divided by the market value
of common equity, measured one week prior to the announcement date. Market
to book ratio is calculated as (total assets + market value of common equity meas-
ured one week prior to the announcement date – book value of common
equity)/total assets. Ln(total assets) is the natural logarithm of the book value of
total assets, expressed in constant December 2002 dollars by means of the IMF
monthly Consumer Price Indices for Europe and the US. Europe dummy is equal
to one for convertibles issued by European firms, and equal to zero for conver-
tibles issued by US firms. t-statistics (calculated by means of White’s heteros-
cedasticity-corrected standard deviations) are inserted in parentheses.
* Significant at the 0.10 level
** Significant at the 0.05 level
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
expense of incurring some additional equity-related costs. Neverthe-
less, our evidence indicates that supply-side differences between the
European and US convertible debt markets tell only part of the story.
More specifically, we find that the divergence in the equity component
size of European and US convertibles is also partly attributable to
non-firm-related differences between the European and the US con-
vertible debt markets.
Articles in the popular financial press often suggest that the secu-
rity- and issuer-related characteristics of European convertibles are
gradually shifting towards the security- and issuer-related character-
istics of US convertibles, so that the differences between the European
and US convertible debt markets should eventually disappear. Our
study casts doubt on this conjecture. More specifically, we show that
most of the security- and issuer-related dissimilarities between the
European and US convertible debt markets tend to remain stable over
time. Rather than converging towards each other, the European and US
convertible debt markets seem to be moving in the same direction.
For example, both European and US convertibles tend to become more
equity-like (with, as a consequence, more negative announcement
effects), and both the European and the US convertible debt issuer
universe tend to become more technology-oriented towards the end of
our sample period.
This study is relevant both from an academic and a practitioner’s
point of view. First, it offers a potential explanation for the divergence
in the results obtained by European and US-based studies on con-
vertible debt. Second, it has important implications for the appropri-
ate treatment of convertible bonds for taxation and financial reporting
purposes. More specifically, our results suggest that European con-
vertibles should receive a different (i.e., more debt-like) tax and
accounting treatment than US convertibles. Lastly, this study may also
be useful for investors that need to decide between adopting Euro-
pean or US convertibles in their portfolios. In particular, our findings
indicate that European convertibles are more appropriate for investors
with conservative targets, whereas US convertibles are more suitable
for investors with a high risk tolerance.
NOTES
1. Confounding announcements were identified by means of the Bloomberg Corporate
Actions Calendar, the Financial Times World Press Monitor, the Ebscohost database
and the company websites.
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2. The countries represented in our Western European convertible debt sample are
(ordered by decreasing numbers of convertible debt offerings): France, the UK, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy, Austria, Bel-
gium, Spain, Denmark and Greece.
3. Of course, this so-called ‘forced conversion’ will only succeed if the conversion value
of the convertibles is higher than the call price. If this is not the case, convertible
bondholders will ask for redemption of their bonds (at the call price), thus leaving the
issuing firm with an additional debt burden.
4. More specifically, non-callable convertible bonds of non-dividend paying firms will
never be converted into equity before maturity. Non-callable convertible bonds of div-
idend paying firms will only be converted prior to maturity if the after-tax dividend
payments on the newly issued stocks exceed the after-tax coupon payments on the
convertibles (Asquith and Mullins (1991)).
5. The German interest rate plays a leading role in the European economy, hence our
choice for the yield on a German Treasury Bond as a proxy for the European risk-free
interest rate. Since the average (median) maturity of our European sample offerings
is only 6.71 (5.48) years, a 5-year Treasury Bond rate seems more appropriate than
the 10-year Treasury Bond rate used for the US convertible debt sample (which has
an average (median) maturity of 10.25 (7.03) years). Our test results are however
robust to the use of other proxies for the risk-free interest rate in the delta calculation
for the European convertibles, e.g. a US Treasury Bond rate instead of a German Trea-
sury Bond rate, a 10-year rate instead of a 5-year rate, etc. (detailed results of these
robustness checks are available upon request).
6. We applied the same winsorization procedure to all of the other continuous variables
discussed throughout this paper. All of our findings remain virtually similar when we
use unwinsorized data, or when we winsorize our data at the 95th and the 5th percentile
(detailed results of these robustness checks are available upon request).
7. We choose 01/01/1999 as cutoff point for our split-sample univariate analyses because,
both in the European and the US sample, approximately 50% of the offerings are
made after this date (cf. Table 1 supra). Our split-sample univariate test results remain
however qualitatively similar when we use other cutoff points (e.g. 01/07/1996, which
is exactly halfway our research window). Detailed split-sample univariate test results
obtained with alternative cutoff points are available upon request.
8. Event study results obtained by means of alternative market index proxies are avail-
able upon request.
9. Event study results obtained through alternative estimation windows are available
upon request.
10. It is worth noting that the daily return volatility of the Datastream US market index
over the window 1990-2002 (i.e., 1.04% on average) is not significantly different from
the daily return volatility of the Datastream Western European market index over the
same window (i.e., 0.95% on average). Thus, our finding that US companies have a
significantly higher stock return volatility than European companies seems to be
uniquely confined to the convertible debt issuer universe (i.e., not to the entire popu-
lation of US versus European firms).
11. For parsimony, we don’t report t-statistics and p-values for the changes in the aver-
age value of the debt-related cost proxies between the two subperiods. These statis-
tics are available upon request.
12. More specifically, Krishnaswami and Yaman (2004) examine the impact of debt-related
financial distress and moral hazard costs and equity-related adverse selection costs on
the equity component size of US convertibles. They find that the structure of con-
vertibles is strongly influenced by financial distress considerations. By contrast, debt-
related moral hazard costs and equity-related adverse selection costs have only very
limited power for explaining the convertible debt design.
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13. Strictly spoken, the Europe dummy captures all the differences between the European
and the US convertible debt sample not accounted for by the nine debt- and/or equity-
related cost proxies included in the regression analysis. It could thus be that the Europe
dummy picks up some firm-related characteristics that are not explicitly measured by
these nine proxy variables, thereby introducing a bias in our test results. Unfortunately
however, it is impossible to conduct a more direct test of the impact of non-issuer-
related aspects on the convertible debt equity component size. In our opinion, the pro-
posed regression analysis is the best way of approximating this impact.
14. Note that this finding is in line with our earlier-formulated intuition that (US) con-
vertible debt issuers mainly design their convertibles in order to mitigate debt-related
costs, even at the expense of incurring some extra equity-related costs.
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